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Abstract
The importance of high salaries to circumvent bureaucratic corruption has been widely recognized
in the policy debate. Yet, there appears to be much reluctance when it comes to the implementation.
In this paper, we argue that deterring corruption through wage incentives may become prohibitively
expensive that the government nds it optimal to accept higher net revenues at the expense of honesty.
Deviating from the existing literature, where monitoring is exogenous, which curtails governments
anti-corruption policy options; we set an endogenous monitoring technology that allows us to capture
the dual role of auditing, as a complement with and as a substitute for wage incentives to deter
bribery. Furthermore, besides the e¢ ciency wage and the outside option, the government could pay
a wage below the outside option, which attracts only dishonest agents to public o¢ ce - capitulation
wage. We nd that when it is costly to monitor tax inspectors, the government is better-o¤ o¤ering
capitulation wages and accepting corruption. When it is optimal to deter bribery, the government
can do it either through e¢ ciency wages or monitoring. The role of e¢ ciency wages decreases in
societies with higher level of dishonesty.
Keywords: Corruption, Endogenous monitoring, Capitulation wage, E¢ ciency wage, Carrot & Stick.
JEL codes: D73; H26; J33; J41.
I am grateful to Tanguy van Ypersele, Cecilia García-Peñalosa, Steeve Mongrain, Hippolyte dAlbis, Maame Esi Woode
and to conference participants at 8th Journées Louis-André Gérard-Varet (2010), Marseille France and WIEM (2010)
Warsaw Poland for their useful comments and suggestions.
yCorresponding author: CREB, Lahore School of Economics, Intersection Main Boulevard DHA Phase VI and Burki
Road, Lahore Pakistan. Email: w.wadho@lahoreschool.edu.pk
1
"I am expected to pay for my petrol when I go for o¢ cial rounds. I am expected to pay for
paper, typing, photocopying, even postage. All of this is o¢ cial work. It adds up to Rupees
6000 per month. Am I mad to pay it from my pocket? What do they (Islamabad) expect?
They know every thing." (Anonymous tax inspector in Pakistan)1
1 Introduction
O¤ering higher public wages has commonly been viewed as an anti-corruption strategy by many acad-
emics, policy makers and multilateral development agencies. In their seminal paper, Becker and Stigler
(1974) show that raising wages along with non-zero audit probability could be used as a strategy to deter
bribery in the public sector. Since then, vast body of literature, both theoretical as well as empirical
shows lower public sector wages as one of the main determinants of bribery (Myrdal 1968, Klitgaard 1988,
Tanzi 1994, Goel and Nelson 1998, Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001). Despite the striking implications
in policy debates, wage incentive strategy seems not so common when it comes to its implementation.
Real wage declines in the public sector have been common in many countries over substantial periods
of time. In a sample of twenty-one countries, Haque and Sahay (1996) report that real wages fell at
an annual average rate of 1.4 percent. In this theoretical paper, we argue that deterring corruption
through wage incentives may become prohibitively expensive that governments nd it optimal to accept
corruption. Further, we show that there is a trade-o¤ between wage incentives based and monitoring
based anticorruption strategies where although the later is expensive but it reduces size of the wage that
ensures honesty.
A fact nding task force on reform of tax administration, set up in 2000 by the then president of
Pakistan, General Pervaiz Musharaf, conducted a survey on the causes of corruption in tax administration.
In this survey, seventy three per cent of the respondents considered poor compensation as a major cause
of corruption. However, this is not limited to Pakistan. There have been a number of studies identifying
lower wages as one of the major causes of malfeasant usage of public o¢ ces.2 The argument is that
less-paid public o¢ cials are more inclined to engage in corrupt practices. When the employees are not
well paid, they may look for other avenues to generate additional resources and in most of the cases it
would be misuse of public o¢ ces. For Ukraine, Gorodnichenko and Klara (2007) nd that public sector
employees receive 24-32% less wages than their private sector counterparts. Yet, workers in both sectors
have essentially identical levels of consumer expenditures and asset holdings.
1Report of the Task Force on Reform of Tax Administration (2000), Central Board of Revenue, Government of Pakistan
2See Myrdal (1968), Klitgaard (1988), Tanzi (1994), Goel and Nelson (1998), Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001).
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Moreover, since lower salaries is a main determinant of corruption in the public sector, the fundamen-
tal response to ensure honesty would be to raise the salaries of bureaucrats above what they could get
elsewhere i.e. paying them e¢ ciency wages (Becker and Stigler 1974). The economic logic behind e¢ -
ciency wages stems from the fact that if there is a probability of detection and punishment, higher salaries
would imply higher costs of dismissal. In this way, higher salaries can prevent corruption by imposing
an opportunity cost to corrupt public o¢ cials. Alternatively, there will be positive incentive e¤ects as
with higher salaries; competent and honest people would be willing to join public o¢ ces (Klitgaard, 1988;
Haque and Sahay, 1996).3
Recently there have been many attempts to test the e¢ ciency wage argument on real world data.
Rauch and Evans (2000) nd no evidence of higher wages deterring corruption. Using data from 35 LDCs,
they found no clear evidence that competitive salaries have any e¤ect on bureaucratsperformance. In the
corruption regressions of Treisman (2000), higher wages have no signicant impact on corruption. Di Tella
and Ernesto (2003) argue that "one potential explanation for the apparent empirical failure of the Becker-
Stigler hypothesis is that these studies include a number of observations drawn from environments where
there is no active audit and the probability of being punished for corruption is near zero, or where there
is very high audit and the probability of being punished for corruption is near one. Since Becker-Stigler
theory predicts that wages should have no e¤ect on corruption in such circumstances, the coe¢ cient on
wages in a corruption regression that does not control for audit intensity will tend to zero". They look at
the role of wage incentives in the crackdown of corruption in public hospitals of Buenos Aires, Argentina.
They nd a negative e¤ect of salaries on corruption when audit is expected to be at intermediate level.
In cross-country regressions for low-income countries, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) nd a sta-
tistically and economically signicant e¤ect of the civil services pay on corruption. They nd that the
relationship between civil-service pay and corruption implies that a rather large increase in wages is
required to eradicate corruption solely by raising wages. They report that "a quasi-eradication of cor-
ruption is associated with a relative wage of two to eight times the manufacturing wage, not taking into
account indirect e¤ect". Thus, empirically, wage incentives reduce corruption in public sector but it raises
questions about its cost e¤ectiveness as a policy tool to deter bribery.
In a theory explaining bureaucratic corruption, Besley and McLaren (1993) (hereafter BM) investigate
a possible causality from corruption to lower public sector wages. In line with the structure of Becker and
Stigler (1974), they show that there can be situations (under parametric conditions) in which governments
3There is another view dealing with fairness and receprocity. Their argument is that low paid workers may reciprocate
unfair treatment by reducing their productivity, see Skott (2005) for detailed discussion.
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may be better-o¤ accepting corruption and o¤ering a wage less than the outside option (capitulation
wage). They look at the tax compliance problem where the government optimizes its revenues net of
administrative costs. BM were the rst to build a theory on governments reluctance to implement
wage incentive policy. They assume exogenous monitoring of tax inspectors where governments can
not inuence monitoring e¤orts. Certainly, this restrains governmentsanti-corruption instruments. In
practice, there are several examples of crackdowns against corruption with massive e¤orts in auditing.
The "mani-pulite" prosecutions in Italy and crackdowns on judicial corruption in Venezuela are few of
them.4 For the United States, Alt and Lassen (2010) argue that the allocation of prosecutorial resources
are endogenously determined and have negative impact on corruption. Di Tella and Ernesto (2003) not
only report a crackdown on corruption in the public hospitals of the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina
during 1996-97 but also could di¤erentiate di¤erent intensities at di¤erent phases of crackdown.
In this study, we extend the BM analysis of exploring the trade-o¤ between wage incentives based
anti-corruption strategy and budgetary balances. The specic type of corruption that we envisage here is
the collusion between a tax collector and a tax payer in evading taxes. In this branch of the government,
the honesty becomes more pressing as dishonesty would imply fewer revenue collections. We consider
problems of both moral hazard and adverse selection: moral hazard arises as bribery can not be observed
without costly monitoring, and adverse selection, as not all potential tax inspectors can be identied
as being corrupt or honest. The government maximizes net revenue and it o¤ers a wage scheme that
generates higher revenues net of administrative costs. It can o¤er three di¤erent wage schemes; a wage
that is o¤ered in the private sector (reservation wage), which attracts both corruptible and honest agents
to join public o¢ ces. It can o¤er a wage higher than the private wage (e¢ ciency wage), which solves the
moral hazard problem, i.e. deters bribery. Or it can o¤er a wage less than the private wage (capitulation
wage), which attracts only dishonest agents in tax o¢ ces.
We di¤er from BM in at least three di¤erent ways. First and the most important is that as compared to
BM, where audit probability is exogenous, we set a monitoring technology that is endogenous. It depends
on two factors with opposing e¤ects; the optimal audit intensity set by the government and a peer-e¤ect
of the number of corrupt tax inspectors. We allow the government to optimize a monitoring intensity
for every wage scheme.5 Di¤erent wage schemes produce di¤erent equilibrium levels of corruption and
thus the amount of revenues that the government receives. In this way, shifting from one wage regime
to another changes the relative costs and benets of monitoring and thus its optimal level. Also, in line
4See Lui (1986) for several examples of crackdowns in China.
5Becker and Stigler (1974) also consider exogenous probability of being caught but they report that it must depend on
the amount spent by the state on detection.
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with the growing literature on peer-e¤ects (i.e. Lui 1986, Andvig and Moene 1990); we consider that the
e¤ectiveness of any monitoring e¤ort should also depend on the environment of corruption in the public
o¢ ces, where a tax inspector operates. Lui (1986) report that a fundamental observation on corruption
is that it becomes very di¢ cult to audit a bureaucrat e¤ectively if many others are also corrupt.
Second, in BM, there is a complete extortion in the sense that if any tax paying household faces
a corrupt tax inspector, it will have to pay a bribe. In our model, corruption takes place only when
a corruptible tax inspector matches with a corruptible tax payer. For any mismatch, there will be no
corruption. Furthermore, we consider the fact that another factor that might inuence the tax inspectors
decision is the easiness of laundering bribe income. Generally, it can be observed that when there is a
probability of getting caught and a penalty associated with it, corrupt tax inspectors may try to remain
inconspicuous by altering their patterns of spending and/or by investing their bribe income in a manner
di¤erent from their legal income. In this way, a costlier laundering would reduce the incentives to be
corrupt.
Relaxing the assumptions of exogenous monitoring and complete extortion results in signicant qual-
itative changes in the equilibrium of corruption and the relative performances of di¤erent wage regimes.
For instance, the wage that deters bribery (e¢ ciency wage) and a wage less than private wage (capit-
ulation wage) would be endogenous. They would depend on the audit intensity set by the government
and the chances of matching between corruptible tax payer and corruptible tax inspector. Thus, in our
setting, the wage that solves the moral hazard problem is endogenous, and the government, through audit
intensity, can a¤ect the size of this wage. This generates a new trade-o¤ where increasing monitoring is
costly but it reduces the size of e¢ ciency wage needed to deter bribery. In this way, the introduction
of endogenous monitoring adds two additional strategies for deterring bribery. Audit can be a comple-
ment to wage incentives (i.e. carrot/stick mix) or an independent instrument as a substitute for wage
incentives (sheer stick). This has very important implications for anti-corruption campaigns as without
o¤ering wage incentives, the government can still ensure complete honesty by enforcing higher auditing.
Both these strategies di¤er in their implications regarding moral hazard and adverse selection problems:
monitoring directly a¤ects the incentives to be corrupt (moral hazard) whereas e¢ ciency wage has an
impact on both incentives to be corrupt and selection (adverse selection).
Second, for the equilibrium of corruption, when tax inspectors are paid e¢ ciency wages, in equilibrium
all are honest. On the contrary, if they are o¤ered capitulation wages, in equilibrium all tax inspectors are
corrupt. The introduction of endogenous monitoring determines the equilibrium of corruption when tax
inspectors are o¤ered reservation wages (in BM there is a mixture of both corrupt and honest bureaucrats).
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Equilibrium depends on monitoring, which in turn depends on the audit intensity and the proportion of
corrupt tax inspectors. When audit intensity is high, in equilibrium all tax inspectors are honest, when it
is low, in equilibrium there is a mixture of both corrupt and honest tax inspectors. For the intermediate
audit intensities, there are multiple equilibria; the equilibrium depends on the proportion of corrupt tax
inspectors (i.e. where they coordinate).
Allowing the honest tax payers/inspectors to refuse bribery implies that corruption takes place only
when a corruptible tax inspector matches with a dishonest tax payer. This has very signicant implica-
tions, especially for the e¢ ciency and the capitulation wage regimes as the size of both wages will now
depend on the level of honesty. For the capitulation wage regime, even though in equilibrium all tax
inspectors are corrupt, the government can still have tax revenues from honest tax paying households (in
BM, the only source of revenues is through successful monitoring). Moreover, the size of e¢ ciency wage
increases with dishonesty implying that the results of BM that the e¢ ciency wage generates the highest
revenues when the level of dishonesty is high is no longer valid. A higher level of dishonesty would imply
higher chances of matching between a corruptible tax payer and a corruptible tax inspector, thus the
expected income with corruption would be higher. With higher expected income of corruption, a higher
compensation would be required to make corruptible tax inspectors behave honestly.
We nd that when it is costly to monitor tax inspectors, the government is better-o¤ o¤ering capit-
ulation wages and accepting corruption. The range where capitulation wage regime dominates the other
wage regimes increases with cost of monitoring and tax base, and decreases with the reservation wage
(outside option). When it is optimal to deter bribery, the government can do this either through incentive
based strategy (carrot/stick mix) or through monitoring. Which of these two is optimal depends on cost
of auditing, level of dishonesty, tax base and reservation wage. The role of e¢ ciency wages decreases
in societies with higher proportion of dishonest agents. In these societies, the wage incentive schemes
become prohibitively expensive and the government would opt monitoring based anti-corruption strategy
when auditing is less costly, and a capitulation wage policy when the auditing is more expensive.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the economy. Section 3
looks at the incentives to be corrupt. Section 4 sets the governments decision problem while section 5
calculates the tax revenues and obtains optimal auditing intensity for each wage regime. In Section 6,
there is pair-wise net revenues comparison for di¤erent wage regimes. Section 7 examines the comparative
statics and section 8 concludes.
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2 Description of the Economy
There is a constant population N of innitely lived, risk-neutral agents. Agents are of two sorts: N
are corruptible and (1   )N are honest. An honest agent regards his integrity as priceless and thus
does not o¤er/take bribe for any material reward. Agents are divided into two groups of citizens 
households, of whom there is a xed measure of n, and to service a population of n potential tax payers,
the government requires m tax inspectors (which we normalize to one). Households are di¤erentiated
according to di¤erences in their labor endowments that determine their relative incomes and their relative
propensities to be taxed. Specically, we assume that a fraction  2 (0; 1), of households are endowed
with " > 1 units of labor (high income) and are liable to pay tax  , while the remaining fraction (1 ) are
endowed with one unit of labor (low income) and owe no tax. The government knows  without knowing
which household actually owes any tax. Taxes are collected by tax inspectors on behalf of the government.
For simplicity, we assume that tax inspectors are exempt from taxes i.e. they are low income type. Each
tax inspector has one unit of labor endowment and is responsible for collecting taxes from nm households.
Corruption arises from the incentive of a tax inspector to conspire with a household to conceal information
(the households income) from the government. In doing so, the tax inspector expects to gain from his
acceptance of a bribe and the household expects to gain from its evasion of tax. A fraction  2 (0; 1) of
tax inspectors are corruptible in this way, while the remaining fraction (1 ) are non-corruptible. There
are selection e¤ects;  can be di¤erent from  (the proportion of corruptible agents).  will be equal to
 2 (0; 1) if tax inspectors are at least o¤ered a wage equal to their outside option (reservation wage)
and  = 1 if they are o¤ered a wage less than their outside option.6 Furthermore, a tax inspector who is
corruptible may or may not be corrupt, i.e. there are incentive e¤ects. There is a fraction  2 (0; 1) of
such tax inspectors who will actually be corrupt, while the remaining fraction (1  ) will stay honest.
2.1 Corruption
Corruption takes place when a corruptible high income household conspires with a corruptible tax in-
spector to declare him as a low income household. For this, a corruptible tax inspector demands b as a
bribe to conceal this information from the government. With probability , a corruptible tax inspector
matches with a corruptible tax payer who owes tax  . The total expected bribe income of a corrupt tax
inspector will be bn. Since, corruption is illegal; a tax inspector who is corrupt may try to remain
inconspicuous by hiding his illegal income by investing this income di¤erently from legal income and/or
by altering his patterns of spending. These activities typically entail costs in one form or another. For
6 If the government sets public wage below the private wage, no one honest would be prepared to become tax inspector.
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purposes of the present analysis, we make a simple assumption that a tax inspector who is corrupt spends
a fraction  2 (0; 1) of his bribe income to conceal his income. Given this, the total bribe income of
corrupt tax inspector is
B = (1  )bn (1)
 can be thought as a parameter measuring the institutional quality (i.e. Rule of law). It can be
explained as an indicator representing the cost of laundering dirty money (bribe income). The closer the
 is to 1, the more e¢ cient are the institutions, and the more costly would be concealing illegal income.
Each corruptible tax inspector faces a probability p of being caught. What determines the chances
of being caught is of the central importance here. Contrary to Besley and McLaren (1993) who assume
exogenous probability of being caught, we have an endogenous monitoring technology which depends on
two factors with opposing e¤ects. First, any probability of being caught must imperatively depend on the
governments on-job audit intensity. An intensive auditing would imply higher chances of being detected.
Second, tax inspectors usually do not operate on their own but are inuenced by their reference groups
such as colleagues and friends. It is plausible to imagine that if many of them are corrupt, it is less likely
that a corrupt tax inspector will be exposed o¤. On the contrary, if most of them are honest, it is almost
certain that, any one who deviates will immediately be identied. Taking both factors into account, we
set a monitoring technology
p = (1  ) (2)
where  is audit intensity set by the government and  is a sensitivity parameter measuring the impact of
peer-e¤ects on probability of being caught. In the rst part of the paper, we let  = 0 and solve the model
where probability of being caught is solely determined by the audit intensity set by the government. In
the second part, we set  = 1 and allow for the impact of peer-e¤ects on probability of being caught. 
is a number of tax inspectors that engage in corruption with a negative sign implying that when many are
corrupt, the probability of being caught is lower. This generates a strategic complementarity in decision
making of tax inspectors. A higher number of corrupt tax inspectors undermine the capacity of internal
investigation units, which increases the expected gains for others. The role of strategic complementarity in
monitoring technology (i.e. probability of detection decreases with the fraction of corrupt tax inspector )
has signicant implications for the equilibrium of corruption. The decision of a corruptible tax inspector
to be corrupt (honest) will increase (decrease) the incentives for others, which may generate multiple
equilibria. We assume that if a conspiracy between a tax inspector and a household is exposed, tax
inspector loses all his income (wage plus bribes) and household is forced (legally) to pay back its taxes.
Obviously, the optimal policy could include some penalty for tax evading households but that is not the
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focus here.7
2.2 Households
Households receive income I and their utility is a linear function of their expected income, i.e. they are
risk neutral. They earn wage w by supplying their labor to private sector. A household with one unit of
labor endowment earns a labor income w (private wage) and is exempt from tax. A household with " > 1
units of labor endowment earns a labor income "w and is liable to pay tax  . The honest high income
households, of whom there is a fraction (1  ), do not evade taxes and their income is "w   . Whereas,
the corruptible high income households may or may not conspire with tax inspectors to declare them as
low income. If not, then its income is "w   , and if so, then its income is uncertain and depends on the
probability of being caught and the bribe paid to tax inspector. With probability p their conspiracy is
exposed and with probability 1   p, a household and a tax inspector are successful in their conspiracy.
Given this, the expected income of a high income household is
E(I; b) =
8<: "w    if b = 0"w   b  p if b > 0 (3)
where b > 0 implies that the household is involved in corruption.
2.3 Tax inspectors
Tax inspectors di¤er in their behavior in public o¢ ces. A fraction (1 ) who are honest, do not demand
bribes and earn income wg by working for the government, where wg is a wage o¤ered in public sector.
While others , may or may not be corrupt; if not, their income is wg, if so, their income is uncertain
and depends on the chances of being caught, the bribe they receive and the cost they incur to conceal
their bribe income. With probability p, their conspiracy with high income household is exposed and they
lose their income (wage plus bribes). Given this, the expected income of a corruptible tax inspector is
E(I; b) =
8<: wg if b = 0(1  p) (wg +B) if b > 0 (4)
where B is given by (1). Equation (4) implies a limited liability of tax inspectors i.e. they can only lose
what they earn. Introducing any nes would increase the expected loss of being corrupt and thus would
reduce the incentives to be corrupt but it would not alter our qualitative results.
7 Introduction of nes will make corruption more expensive but will not alter our qualitative results.
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PART I: without peer-e¤ects
In this part we solve the model with  = 0 which implies that probability of being caught is solely
determined by the audit intensity set by the government. This allows us to focus only on the endogenous
auditing and to analyze the trade-o¤ between auditing and e¢ ciency wages without any peer-e¤ect.
3 Incentives to be corrupt
A dishonest high income household will conspire with a corruptible tax inspector and will o¤er him bribe
if its expected income with bribe is at least equal to its income net of tax paid. From (3), the maximum
bribe that a high income household may be willing to o¤er is
b = (1  p) (5)
Equation (5) implies that a corruptible household is willing to pay no more than what it expects to save
from its tax evasion. Given b, a corruptible tax inspector may be corrupt and may exploit his o¢ ce
if doing so earns him higher utility than otherwise. His expected income is given by (4); he would be
corrupt only if his expected income with corruption is higher than his income without corruption.
A corruptible tax inspector will only be corrupt if
(1  p) [wg + (1  )bn]  wg
By substituting in for b from equation (5), the incentive compatibility constraint of a tax inspector
becomes
(1  p)2(1  )n
p
 wg (6)
The condition in (6) is the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) for a corruptible tax inspector who
decides to be corrupt. A corruptible tax inspector will opt to be corrupt if (6) is satised, and if not,
he will stay honest. Intuitively, a tax inspector is more likely to be corrupt; the less he expects to lose
in his legal income if he is caught and the more he expects to gain in illegal income if he is successful in
corruption. By substituting in for p = , we can demarcate di¤erent equilibrium conditions as
 =
8<: 1 8 wg < f()0 8 wg  f() (7)
where f()  (1 )2ns and s = (1  ).
The equilibrium condition in (7) highlights the role of wage incentives for the determination of cor-
ruption. The intuition behind the above condition is that when public sector wages are higher than the
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expected gains of corruption, even a potentially corruptible tax inspector would stay honest. On the con-
trary, when wages are low, every corruptible tax inspector would be corrupt. It is important to note that
the threshold of wages that demarcate equilibria in (7) is endogenous and depends on the audit intensity.
Thus a wage that ensures no-corruption (e¢ ciency wage) will also be endogenous. A crucial factor for
the determination of the level of e¢ ciency wage would be the audit intensity set by the government.
Thus, contrary to the previous literature, here, auditing will have a dual role where apart from its direct
negative impact on the incentives of corruption, it will also complement with wage incentives.
4 The governments problem
The government collects taxes from high income households by levying lump-sum tax  . It employs tax
inspectors to work on its behalf and pays them a salary wg. It investigates tax inspectors with intensity
, which costs it c of its aggregate tax revenues n.8 This is in line with the deterrence theory that
increasing risk of prosecution requires more prosecutorial resources.9 As in Besley and McLaren (1993),
the government maximizes its tax revenues net of administrative costs. Apart from what the government
does in their model (i.e. optimal public wage policy), here, not only it chooses an optimal wage policy
but it also chooses the optimal audit intensity. Since auditing is costly, the government optimizes it by
looking at the additional revenues it fetches and the costs associated with it. The government optimizes
audit intensity , and o¤ers a wage wg which yields it higher net revenues. We consider three possible
wage strategies for the government. First, it might pay an e¢ ciency wage wg = we, which deters bribery
and nobody behaves dishonestly. Second, it might pay a reservation wage wg = w (outside option), which
attracts a mixture of honest and dishonest agents. Third, it can pay a capitulation wage wg = wc, which
is below the reservation wage and attracts only corruptible agents.
Corruption takes place when dishonest tax inspector matches with dishonest household who owes tax,
 . With probability (1   )(1   ), an honest household matches with an honest tax inspector; with
probability (1   ), an honest tax payer encounters a corruptible tax inspector, and with probability
(1   ), a corruptible tax payer meets an honest tax inspector. In all three cases, households declare
their true type and submit n(1   ) taxes to the government. Whereas, with probability , a
corruptible tax payer nds a corruptible tax inspector and they do not submit taxes. The government
8A cost function proportional to n helps us to avoid size e¤ects. Further, we choose linear cost function to get
analytical solution, our qualitative results will not change by generalizing it to any increasing cost function.
9Becker and Stigler (1974) do not explicitly model it but they implicitly assume that probability of being caught is
function of the governmental resources spent on detection. Alt and Lassen (2010) nd that the allocation of prosecutorial
resources is endogenous for the United States.
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sets on-job auditing, and with probability p, a conspiracy of a tax inspector with a corrupt household is
exposed; household is forced to pay its tax liability and tax inspector loses his wage and bribe income,
B. On its expenditure, the government pays a wage wg and incurs a cost cn to audit tax inspectors.
Given this, net revenues of the government are
NR = n(1  ) + pn + pB   wg (1  p)  cn (8)
5 Tax revenues and optimal auditing
The government can o¤er three di¤erent wage schemes: the reservation wage, the e¢ ciency wage or
the capitulation wage. Governments decision problem is two dimensional: rst, it optimizes the audit
intensity for every wage scheme and then it o¤ers a wage scheme that generates higher net revenues.
Consider rst the optimization problem when the government o¤ers reservation wages i.e. outside option
wg = w.
5.1 Reservation wages
When the government o¤ers reservation wages i.e. wg = w, there would be a mixture of both honest
and corruptible agents who join tax o¢ ces. The proportion of corruptible tax inspectors  is equal to
the proportion of corruptible agents in the society,  = . Tax o¢ ces comprise the pool of corruptible
and honest tax inspectors and from (6) the incentives to be corrupt would solely be determined by
the monitoring technology. Since, incentives to be corrupt depend on monitoring; the government can
eliminate corruption by tightening the audit up to a level where expected gains of corruption fall short of
its losses. We call it a "sheer stick" strategy where the government o¤ers a reservation wage but controls
corruption by tightening the audit. From the ICC in (6), the audit intensity that ensures all corruptible
tax inspectors stay honest is   2s+x 
p
4sx+x2
2s , where x =
w
n is a ratio of wage bill to tax base. The
threshold  sets the expected gains of corruption equal to the reservation wage, f() = w. Thus, for
any audit intensity greater or equal to , every corruptible tax inspector will stay honest and for any
audit intensity less than , every corruptible tax inspector will be corrupt.
Given this, when the government o¤ers reservation wages, there can be two di¤erent equilibria de-
marcated by the audit intensity
 =
8<: 1 8  < 0 8    (9)
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Proposition 1 8  < , there is a unique equilibrium such that all corruptible tax inspectors are
corrupt, and 8   , there is a unique equilibrium such that all corruptible tax inspectors stay honest.
Since incentives to be corrupt f()  (1 )2ns decreases with audit intensity , for any audit
intensity less than , expected gains of corruption always exceeds its expected losses, the ICC will
always be satised and in equilibrium all corruptible tax inspectors will be corrupt. While for any audit
intensity greater or equal to , the ICC is never satised and in equilibrium all corruptible tax inspectors
will stay honest.
Proposition 1. implies that when government o¤ers reservation wages, there can be two di¤erent
equilibria demarcated by the audit intensity. Thus, net revenues of the government will be di¤erent in
two equilibria. In the following, we study in detail the two sub cases of equilibria given in (9) and the
corresponding tax revenues.
Consider rst the case where the government o¤ers reservation wages and the audit intensity is low
such that in equilibrium all corruptible tax inspectors are corrupt.
5.1.1 Reservation wages with low audit
When audit intensity is low i.e.  < , the ICC is always satised. In equilibrium all corruptible tax
inspectors are corrupt. In this case, governments net revenues in (8) are
NRL = n(1  2) + pn2 + p(1  )(1  p)n3   w(1  p2)  cn
By substituting in for p we get
NRL = n(1  2) + n2 + (1  )n2s  w(1  2)  cn
The government maximizes NRL with respect to audit intensity. The rst order conditions yield
FOC n2 + n2s  2n2s+ w2   cn = 0
Increasing audit intensity has both positive and negative e¤ects on net revenues. All positive e¤ects
arise from the fact that higher intensity increases the probability of being caught. With higher probability
of being caught, corruptible households will be more inclined toward paying their taxes. There are also
negative e¤ects as increasing audit increases the cost of audit. Second, there is also an indirect e¤ect as
higher audit implies lower probability of success, which implies lower expected bribes (b = (1  p)) and
thus the lower amount of bribe income conscated by the government.
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The audit intensity that maximizes NRL is
L =
2(1 + s+ x)  c
22s
The rst and obvious implication of the optimal audit L is that it decreases with cost of auditing and
is eventually equal to zero for c = cl  2(1 + s + x). When cost of auditing is less than cl, it is always
optimal to audit, while for any cost greater than or equal to cl, it would be optimal not to audit tax
inspectors (i.e. L = 0).
By substituting in for L, the corresponding net revenues are
NRL =
8<: n

d  x+ (2(1+s+x) c)2
42s

for c < cl
n (d  x) for c  cl
(10)
where d = 1   2. Given the optimal audit intensity, we can now deduce a condition such that there
exists an equilibrium where all corruptible tax inspectors are corrupt. From Proposition 1, the equilibrium
where all corruptible tax inspectors are corrupt exists when the audit intensity is lower than the threshold
. Since L decreases with c, there exists a c  2(1   s +p4sx+ x2) such that L = . 8c > c,
L <  and there exists an equilibrium where all corruptible tax inspectors are corrupt.
5.1.2 Reservation wages with high audit
Consider now the case where the government o¤ers reservation wages and monitor tax inspectors with
high audit. When the government puts higher audit, precisely when   , the ICC is never satised.
In equilibrium all tax inspectors are honest and the government receives all tax revenues.
The corresponding net revenues with high audit are
NRH = n (1  x  c) (11)
5.2 E¢ ciency wages
To nd the e¢ ciency wage, we employ the standard technique of equating tax inspectors expected income
when he is corrupt with the income when he is honest. From equilibrium condition in (7), the wage that
deters bribery is f()
we =
(1  )2 (1  )n

Given this we dene e¢ ciency wage as a maximum of reservation wage and f(), we = maxfw; f()g.
This implies that the e¢ ciency wage is at least equal to the outside option. The e¢ ciency wage is
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endogenous and it depends on the model parameters especially on the optimal audit intensity set by the
government. The comparative statics of e¢ ciency wage can be obtained by di¤erentiating it with respect
to di¤erent parameters. First, for quite natural reasons, higher the audit intensity is, lower will be the
e¢ ciency wage. It is important to note that if there is no auditing ( = 0), there exists no nite wage that
makes tax inspector behave honestly. Intuitively, when the government does not audit, the probability
of being caught is zero, and the expected gains of corruption will always be greater than the expected
losses. On the contrary, a higher auditing implies higher probability of being caught and thus a lower
expected income of corruption. With lower expected income of corruption, a smaller compensation would
be required to make corruptible tax inspectors behave honestly. In this way, auditing complements with
wage incentives; i.e. the higher the auditing is, the lower will be the required compensation to ensure
honesty.
Further, the probability of a matching of corruptible tax inspector with a corruptible tax payer
increases the size of e¢ ciency wage. Higher chances of matching with dishonest tax payer increase
expected bribe income, thus higher compensation would be required to make them honest. Thus, e¢ ciency
wage will be more expensive in societies with higher proportion of corruptible agents. On the other hand,
cost of laundering bribe income  reduces the e¢ ciency wage. With better rule of law, tax inspectors
would spend a higher share of its income to remain inconspicuous implying that lower compensation
would be required to make them honest.
When the government pays e¢ ciency wages,  =  and in equilibrium all tax inspectors will be honest,
 = 0. In this case, the government receives all tax revenues n. The governments net revenues with
e¢ ciency wages are
NRe = n  we   cn
By substituting in for we
NRe = n  (1  )
2
ns

  cn (12)
The rst order conditions yield
FOC
ns
2
  ns  cn = 0
Increasing audit intensity increases the probability of being caught which reduces the e¢ ciency wage,
thus, it increases the net revenues. On the other hand, increasing auditing requires higher resources for
auditing, which implies higher costs, thus, it decreases the net revenues.
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The optimal audit intensity that maximizes NRe is
e =
p
sp
s+ c
Since e¢ ciency wage is we = maxfw; f()g; given the f(), we know that for  = , w = f() and for
any  < , f() > w. Given the optimal audit e, we can deduce a precise condition which demarcates
w and f() in terms of size. Since e decreases with c and  does not depend on c, there exists a
c 

4s3
(2s+x p4sx+x2)2   s

such that for c = c, e =  and for any c > c, e <  implying that
f() > w.
Given this, the corresponding net revenues with e¢ ciency wage are
NRe =
8<: n
 
1 + 2s  2psps+ c for c  c
n (1  x  c) for c < c
(13)
5.3 Capitulation wages
The third wage regime occurs when the government o¤ers a wage that is lower than the reservation wage.
This is a situation when the government gives up against corruption and does not try to deter bribery.
Capitulation wage is a minimum wage at which the expected income of a corruptible tax inspector is
equal to his outside option, (1  p)(wc +B) = w. This gives a capitulation wage
wc =
w
1     (1  )(1  )n
By looking at the comparative statics; capitulation wage increases with audit intensity and if there is no
audit, it is equal to reservation wage less of bribe income. An intensive audit implies a lower expected
bribe income implying a lower capitulation wage. With the same reasoning, capitulation wage will be
higher with higher . Furthermore, the capitulation wage decreases with probability to meet corruptible
tax payer, which implies that the role of capitulation wages increases in societies with higher proportion
of corruptible agents.10
With capitulation wages, there are only corruptible tax agents who accept to work in tax o¢ ces,
i.e.  = 1. Contrary to BM where in capitulation wage regime, the only source of revenues is a tax
recovered through successful monitoring, here, apart from the successful monitoring, the honest tax
10By looking at the capitulation wage, one can see that it may be negative (when the bribe income is higher than the
legal income, w). The special case of negative wages can be thought as a sister concept of "tax farming" in ancient Rome.
In ancient Rome, tax farmers were often utilized to collect provincial taxes. Tax farmers paid in advance for the right to
collect taxes in particular area. In fact, tax farming was quite protable, tax farmers used to collect more than what they
paid to the government and it became a major investment vehicle for wealthy and inuential citizens (Levi 1988).
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paying households would refuse paying bribes to corrupt tax inspectors and they would submit their true
taxes.
Given this, the governments net revenues with capitulation wages are
NRc = n(1  ) + pn + p(1  )(1  p)n2   wc(1  p)  cn
By substituting in for wc and p,
NRc = n(1  ) + n   ns(1  )  w(1  )
1     cn
The rst order conditions yield
FOC n   ns  w(1  )
(1  )2   cn = 0
Increasing audit increases the probability of getting caught, which increases the tax revenues. On the
other hand, more intensive auditing requires more resources that increases the cost and reduces the net
revenues. Furthermore, an increase in audit lowers the probability of success, which results in lower
expected income of bribes. Since, the capitulation wage decreases with expected bribes; a lower expected
bribe income implies a higher capitulation wage to be paid. The optimal audit intensity that maximizes
NRc is
c = 1 
r
ax
   c
where a = 1   . The optimal audit intensity c decreases with c, and there exists cc     ax such
that for cost of audit greater than cc, it is optimal not to audit.
Given this, the maximum net revenues of the government with capitulation wages are
NRc =
8<: n(1  x   c  2
p
ax
p
   c) for c < cc
n (1  x  ) for c  cc
(14)
6 Net revenues comparisons
Having found the optimal audit intensities and the net tax revenues for di¤erent wage schemes, the next
task remains to look at the relative performance of each wage regime in terms of revenues generation. We
do so through pair-wise comparison of the capitulation wage with other wage regimes, by looking at the
decision point where the government is indi¤erent between capitulation wage and other wage regimes.
Capitulation wage in (14) generates two di¤erent levels of net revenues i.e. when it is optimal to audit
and when it is optimal not to audit. Consider rst the case when it is optimal to audit (i.e. c > 0).
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Since all tax inspectors are corruptible, the audit will not have any e¤ect on tax compliances as the only
tax payers are the honest households. The only positive e¤ect on revenues will come through an increase
in the amount of nes collected from the corrupt tax inspectors who are caught. Generally speaking,
the central idea behind any auditing e¤ort is to increase the tax compliances and it can never be just
collecting nes. Without loss of generality, we can assume that when the government o¤ers capitulation
wages, it knows that only corruptible agents will be tax inspectors and putting any auditing will not
increase tax compliances, it decides not to audit. Even when it is optimal to audit, reservation wage with
high audit intensity always generates more revenues than the capitulation wages.
Lemma 1. Reservation wage with high audit always dominates capitulation wage for any c < cc.
Proof. see Appendix 1-A.
This has very intuitive implication; when it is less costly to audit, the government is always better-o¤
putting high audit. However, this might not be the case when the cost is higher, precisely when c  cc.
In the remaining of this paper, the corresponding revenues with capitulation wages are those where it is
optimal not to audit i.e. c = 0.
In the following we see when will it be optimal for the government to accept corruption and do not
deter bribery.
6.1 Capitulation vs E¢ ciency
By comparing (13) and (14), we get a threshold of c such that both wage regimes generate equal revenues.
First, we compare when we = (1 )
2ns
 ; capitulation wages yield higher net revenues than e¢ ciency
wages for any c > bc   (2s+x+)2 4s24s . The bc demarcates the region where capitulation wages dominate
e¢ ciency wages in terms of revenues generation. The comparative statics can be obtained by di¤eren-
tiating bc with respect to x. The lower the x is, the lower is bc and the greater will be the region where
capitulation wages dominate the e¢ ciency wages. The relationship between bc and x can better be under-
stood by decomposing x = wn ; it increases with the reservation wage and decreases with the tax rate.
The impact of the reservation wage on capitulation and e¢ ciency wage regimes is very straightforward;
the reservation wage has no e¤ect on e¢ ciency wage regime and it has a negative impact on net revenues
in capitulation wage regimes. Since capitulation wage wc = w1    (1   )ns increases with w; the
higher reservation wage would imply higher capitulation wage and lower net revenues.
Whereas, the tax rate a¤ects both wage regimes through its direct and indirect channels. The direct
e¤ect arises as an increase in tax rate increases the total volume of tax and the indirect e¤ect takes
place through its e¤ect on wages (both on e¢ ciency and on capitulation). The increase in tax rate has
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positive direct e¤ect on revenues with capitulation wages as an increase in tax rate increases the tax
volume. Whereas, for the e¢ ciency wages; it has a positive (increase in tax volume) and a negative
(increase in total cost of auditing) e¤ect on the net revenues. The direct positive e¤ect (increase in tax
volume) is greater for the e¢ ciency wages as compared to the capitulation wages as in the later only
honest households pay taxes. On the contrary, the indirect e¤ect of increase in tax rate has a negative
e¤ect on e¢ ciency wage regime and a positive e¤ect on capitulation wage regime. The higher tax rate
implies a higher expected bribe (b = (1  p)) that has opposing e¤ects on two wage equations. For the
e¢ ciency wage, the higher the expected bribe is, the higher will be the e¢ ciency wage thus the higher
will be the wage bill, and the lower will be the net revenues. Whereas, for the capitulation wage, higher
expected bribes imply lower capitulation wage (lower wage bill) and thus the higher net revenues. By
taking into account the implications of both w and  , the lower the x (lower wor/and higher ) is, the
greater would be the role of capitulation wages.
Consider now the case when the e¢ ciency wage is equal to reservation wage. This is similar to
o¤ering the reservation wage with high audit intensity (sheer stick). Capitulation wages will yield higher
net revenues than the e¢ ciency wages for any c > ch  2s2s+x p4sx+x2 . The threshold ch increases
with x implying that lower the x is, the larger will be the region where capitulation wages dominate
the e¢ ciency wages. A decrease in x (decrease in w or/and increase in ) increases net revenues with
capitulation wages. Since capitulation wage decreases with w, any decrease in w reduces the wage bill
and increases the net revenues. Whereas an increase in tax rate always increases tax volume and the net
revenues. For the e¢ ciency wages, any decrease in w increases the net revenues by directly reducing the
wage bill. While it has also an opposite indirect impact as the lower w implies a higher audit intensity
  2s+x 
p
4sx+x2
2s , thus lower net revenues. For changes in tax rate, there are both positive and negative
e¤ects on net revenues with e¢ ciency wages. The higher the tax rate is, the higher will be the tax volume
but also the higher will be the cost. The indirect e¤ect comes through the audit intensity ; since 
decreases with x, the higher the tax rate is, the higher will be the audit intensity, thus the lower will be
the tax revenues.
Proposition 2 There exists bx   2s+ p4s2 + 22 such that 8x  bx, capitulation wages generate
higher revenues than e¢ ciency wages 8c > ch, and 8x > bx , capitulation wages generate higher revenues
than e¢ ciency wages 8c > bc.
Proof. see Appendix 1-B.
The immediate implication of Proposition 2 is that not only there is interplay between the honest
and the corrupt equilibrium but also there is interplay between the policies that achieve the honest
19
equilibrium. The government can deter corruption by two di¤erent policy instruments. The honest
equilibrium can be achieved either by wage incentives (carrot/stick mix strategy) i.e. the government
pays wage we = (1 )
2ns
 with some audit, or by the sheer stick strategy where it pays outside option
but puts tighter audit which forces all corruptible tax inspectors to behave honestly. What distinguishes
one policy option from the other in terms of revenue generations is the level of x. For any x < bx, the
government always generates higher revenues by sheer stick strategy than the wage incentives strategy.
Between sheer stick and the capitulation wages, which one generates higher revenues depends on the cost
of audit. For any cost less than ch, sheer stick always generates higher revenues than the capitulation
wages, and it is optimal (in terms of higher revenues) for the government to deter corruption. While for
any cost greater than ch, it is optimal for the government to give up against corruption and o¤er the
capitulation wages. On the other hand, when x > bx, the government will generate higher revenues with
wage incentives than with the sheer stick. In comparison with capitulation wages, the government will
go for the corruption deterrence for any cost of audit less than bc, and it will give up against corruption
if the cost is greater than the threshold bc.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the threshold bx that demarcates sheer stick strategy from
wage incentives increases with the proportion of corruptible agents, . This implies that the role of sheer
stick strategy is greater in highly corruptible societies than in less corruptible societies. Whereas, the
role of incentives based strategies would be greater in less corruptible societies than in highly corruptible
societies.
6.2 Capitulation vs Reservation
Consider rst the case of reservation wages with low audit where in equilibrium all corruptible tax
inspectors are corrupt.
6.2.1 Low audit
From (10), for 8c  cl, it is optimal not to audit, i.e. L = 0. Consider rst the case when there is no
auditing with both reservation and capitulation wages. The capitulation wage always yields higher net
revenues than the reservation wages for any  > . Whereas in the case when with reservation wages,
it is optimal to audit i.e. L > 0, there exists a threshold ec  2(1 + s + x   2p(1  )(   )) such
that capitulation and reservation wages yield equal net revenues. And for any c > ec, capitulation wages
generate more net revenues than reservation wages.
Proposition 3 For L = 0, capitulation wages yield higher net revenues than reservation wages for any
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 > . For L > 0, there exists ex  s p(1 )( )2p
(1 )( ) such that for any x > ex, capitulation wages always
yield higher net revenues. And for any x < ex, capitulation wages yield higher net revenues for 8c > ec,
whereas reservation wages yield higher net revenues for 8c < ec.
Proof. see Appendix 1-C.
When it is costly to audit tax inspectors such that it becomes optimal for the government not to
audit, the capitulation wage regime generates more revenues than the reservation wages if the proportion
of corruptible agents  is greater than the cost of concealing bribe income . In countries with endemic
corruption, this condition seems satised. Since, corruption takes place by a matching of the corruptible
households with the corruptible tax inspectors, the higher  implies higher chances of matching, thus the
higher corruption. In other words, corruption is more likely feature of the societies with higher . On
the other hand, it should be easier to conceal bribe income when there is a wide-spread corruption. Thus
higher  is associated with lower  and vice-versa.
In the case when L > 0, which wage regime generates higher revenues crucially depends on the
reservation wage and tax base. Capitulation wage regime generates higher revenues for any x > ex. When
x is less than ex, reservation wages with low audit will generate higher revenues than capitulation wages
for any cost less than ec. The threshold ec increases with x, implying that lower the x is, the lower will be ec,
and the greater will be the region where capitulation wages generate higher revenues than the reservation
wage.
6.2.2 High audit
When the government o¤ers reservation wages and puts high audit, it is the same case when we = w
(sheer stick). For any c > ch, capitulation wages would yield higher net revenues than the reservation
wages with high audit.
7 Comparative statics
In the previous section we saw that depending on the cost of auditing and the ratio of wage bill to tax
base, there are congurations where the government is better-o¤ accepting corruption at the expense
of higher net revenues. In this section, we put all results together and see when it is optimal for the
government to prefer one wage regime over the others. There can be three possible scenarios with respect
to corruption. If the e¢ ciency wages generate higher revenues than other wage regimes, the government
will o¤er e¢ ciency wages and in equilibrium there is no corruption. On the other hand, if capitulation
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wages generate higher revenues, the government gives up against corruption, and in equilibrium all
tax inspectors are corrupt. The third scenario is when the government generates higher revenues with
reservation wages and there is a mixture of both corruptible and honest tax inspectors. Before going
into a detailed comparison, we assume that  > . This implies that when it is costly to audit such that
L = 0, the government is always better-o¤ o¤ering the capitulation wages than the reservation wages
with low audit.
For revenues generation, which wage regime yields higher tax revenues crucially depends on the cost
of audit c, the ratio of wage bill to tax base x and the proportion of corruptible agents . Consider rst
the situation when x is greater than the threshold bx.
Proposition 4 For 1  x > bx;
 reservation wages with low audit are always dominated by other wage regimes.
 8c 2 (0; c), reservation wages with high audit yield higher net revenues than other wage regimes.
 8c 2 (c;bc), e¢ ciency wages yield higher net revenues than other wage regimes.
 8c > bc, capitulation wages yield higher net revenues than other wage regimes.
Proof. see Appendix 1-D.
This result has signicant implications for the public policy. When reservation wage is higher or/and
tax base is lower, the government is better-o¤ by either completely eliminating corruption or not at all.
There is no role for a policy that results in mixture of corruptible and honest tax inspectors in the tax
o¢ ces. Thus, in the situation when x is high, the government would not o¤er reservation wages with
low audit intensity. Moreover, whether it is better for the government to eliminate corruption or to give
up against depends on the cost of auditing. When the cost of auditing is less than or equal to bc, the
government will eliminate corruption and when the cost of auditing is greater than bc, the government will
be better-o¤ giving up against corruption. For eliminating corruption, the government has two policy
options; sheer stick and wage incentives (carrot/stick mix). When the cost is lower than or equal to c,
the government would be better-o¤ o¤ering the sheer stick strategy and for any cost of audit c 2 (c;bc),
the wage incentives would be the dominant strategy. Thus for low cost of auditing; reservation wages
with high audit, for the intermediate cost of auditing; e¢ ciency wages and for the high cost of auditing;
capitulation wages would be the dominant wage strategy.
Consider now the situation when x is smaller than the threshold bx.
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Proposition 5 For x 2 (0; bx);
 reservation wages with low audit are always dominated by other wage regimes.
 e¢ ciency wages are dominated by other wage regimes.
 8c 2 (0; ch), reservation wages with high audit yield higher net revenues than other wage regimes.
 8c > ch, capitulation wages yield higher net revenues than other wage regimes.
Proof. see Appendix 1-B.
Contrary to the case when x is high, for a lower x, e¢ ciency wages are either dominated by the
sheer stick strategy or by capitulation wages. From the policy perspective, when the reservation wage
(outside option) is low or/and tax base is high, the government generates higher revenues by o¤ering the
reservation wage with high audit when auditing is less costly, and by o¤ering capitulation wages when
auditing is more costly.
A lower x means a lower w or/and higher  for a given population of taxable households n. Consider
rst the impact of reservation wage; the reservation wage has no e¤ect on revenues with e¢ ciency wages,
while it has positive e¤ect on revenues with capitulation wages. The lower the reservation wage is, the
lower will be the capitulation wage, and thus the lower will be the wage bill. For the reservation wage
with high audit, there are two opposite e¤ects; there is a direct positive e¤ect as the lower the reservation
wage is, the lower will be the wage bill thus the higher will be the net revenues. And there is an indirect
negative e¤ect as the lower the reservation is, the lower will be the x, the higher will be the audit intensity
 = 2s+x 
p
4sx+x2
2s , the higher will be the total cost of auditing (c
), and thus, the lower will be the
net revenues. Overall for reservation wages with high audit, the direct e¤ect dominates the indirect one
such that lower reservation wage is associated with higher revenues.
On the other hand, the tax rate has both direct and indirect e¤ects for all three wage regimes. Both
e¤ects are positive for the capitulation wages and the reservation wages with high audit. Whereas for
the e¢ ciency wages, the direct e¤ect is positive and the indirect e¤ect is negative. Increasing tax rate
increases the overall tax revenues for all wage regimes (direct e¤ect). For capitulation wages, the higher
the tax rate is, the lower will be the capitulation wage, and the higher will be net revenues (indirect
e¤ect). Similarly, for reservation wages with high audit when the tax rate is higher  = 2s+x 
p
4sx+x2
2s is
lower, thus the total cost of audit (c) will be lower and net revenues will be higher. While for e¢ ciency
wages, this indirect channel has negative e¤ect on the net revenues. The higher tax rate implies a higher
e¢ ciency wage, higher wage bill and thus lower net revenues.
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Which of these two scenarios is more likely depends on the level of dishonesty, i.e. proportion of the
corruptible agents, . The threshold bx  [ 2(1   ) +q4(1  )2 + 2] that demarcates these two
scenarios increases with . Thus higher the dishonesty is, the higher will be the bx, and more likely would
be the scenario where the e¢ ciency wage strategy is dominated by other wages. This implies that the role
of e¢ ciency wages decreases in societies where the proportion of corruptible agents is higher. In these
societies, wage incentive schemes would be very expensive and the government would opt either a sheer
stick policy when the monitoring is less expensive or a capitulation wage policy when the monitoring is
expensive.
PART II: with peer-e¤ects
In this section we allow peer-e¤ects a¤ecting the probability of being caught (i.e.  = 1), which
implies that the e¤ectiveness of any audit would now depend on the number of corrupt tax inspectors
or on corruption itself. Thus, probability of being caught is p = (1   ) and there is a strategic
complementarity in the decision making of tax inspectors. Given this, the ICC in (6) will now become
(1  (1  ))2ns
(1  )  wg (6  a)
The strategic complementarity in the decision making of corruptible tax inspectors determines the equi-
librium level of corruption. Given the wage, wg and the audit intensity , the incentive compatibility
constraint in (6  a) is a function of the proportion of corruptible tax inspectors who opt to be corrupt,
. Given this, one can deduce a fraction  2 (0; 1) of dishonest tax inspectors who are corrupt. Consider
a  2 (0; 1) for a given wg and , such that (6   a) is either satised with inequality or is not satised
at all. Both of these situations can not be an equilibrium: in the rst case, some of the corruptible tax
inspectors choose not to be corrupt when it pays them to be corrupt, as a result  would rise until  = 1.
In the second case, some of the corruptible tax inspectors opt to be corrupt while it does not pay them to
be corrupt, as a result  would decline until  = 0. Thus, there can only be two equilibria where either
all corruptible tax inspectors are corrupt or all of them stay honest.
Having said this, we can dene two thresholds from the ICC in (6   a) as a function of the audit
intensity , f(;). Consider rst, if all tax inspectors were honest, then  = 0 and the left hand side of
(6   a) is f(0;), which represents the expected gains of corruption given that all other tax inspectors
were honest. When f(0;) > wg, the agent will be corrupt even if no one else is corrupt. Consider now
if all tax inspectors were corrupt,  = 1 and the left hand side of (6  a) is f(1;), which represents the
expected gains of corruption given that all corruptible tax inspectors were corrupt. Given this, we can
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demarcate di¤erent equilibrium conditions as
 =
8>>><>>>:
1 8 wg < f(0;)  (1 )
2ns

0 8 wg  f(1;)  (1 d)
2ns
d
0 or 1 8 f(1;) > wg  f(0;)
(7  a)
As it was the case with without peer-e¤ects, the equilibrium condition in (7 a) depends on the monitoring
technology, which is endogenous. There are two main di¤erences between (7) and (7  a): rst, because
of strategic complementarity, there are multiple equilibria when public sector wages are at intermediate
levels. Second, the size of wage that ensures honesty is bigger than the one without peer-e¤ects (i.e.
f(1;)  f()) . In this way, introduction of peer-e¤ects would make wage incentive based strategy more
expensive.
The government problem is same as in (8). The equilibria of corruption when the government o¤ers
reservation wages will now depend on the audit intensity as well as on the strategic complementarity. From
the ICC in (6 a), the audit intensity that ensures that in equilibrium all corruptible tax inspectors stay
honest is  = 
 
1
d
  2s+x p4sx+x22sd . The threshold  sets the expected gains of corruption (given that
every corruptible tax inspector is corrupt) equal to the reservation wage, f(1;) = w. Thus, for any audit
intensity greater or equal to , every corruptible tax inspector will stay honest irrespective of whether
others are corrupt or honest. Similarly, there is a lower bound of audit intensity   2s+x 
p
4sx+x2
2s (by
setting f(0;) = w), such that any intensity less than this, the ICC is always satised and in equilibrium
all corruptible tax inspectors will be corrupt.
Given this, when the government o¤ers reservation wages, there can be three di¤erent equilibria
demarcated by the audit intensity
 =
8>>><>>>:
1 8  <   2s+x 
p
4sx+x2
2s
0 8     2s+x 
p
4sx+x2
2sd
0 or 1 if  >   
(9  a)
Proposition 6 8  < , there is a unique equilibrium such that all corruptible tax inspectors are
corrupt, 8   , there is a unique equilibrium such that all corruptible tax inspectors stay honest. And
for  >   , there are multiple equilibria.
Note that the condition for the equilibrium in which all corruptible tax inspectors are corrupt is same
as without peer-e¤ects in (9). Strategic complementarity has two e¤ects on the equilibrium of corruption:
rst, the size of audit intensity that ensures all tax inspectors behave honestly is bigger (i.e.  > ).
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Second, for the intermediate audit intensities, there are multiple equilibria. There can be an equilibrium
where all corruptible tax inspectors stay honest or an equilibrium where all corruptible tax inspectors are
corrupt. Which of these two equilibria occurs depends on the coordination of corruptible tax inspectors.
When the government o¤ers reservation wages, there can be three di¤erent equilibria of corruption
implying three di¤erent amounts of the tax revenues. The government optimizes its revenues in each of
the three cases and sets the audit intensity that maximizes net revenues. Consider rst the case when the
government o¤ers reservation wages with low audit such that in equilibrium all corruptible tax inspectors
are corrupt. The optimal audit intensity that maximizes net revenues is L = d
2(1+s+x) c
2d22s
, and the
corresponding revenues are
NRL =
8<: n

d  x+ (d2(1+s+x) c)2
4d22s

for c < c0l
n (d  x) for c  c0l
(10  a)
where c0l = (1   2)cl.11 And the equilibrium where all corruptible tax inspectors are corrupt exists for
any c  c0  (1  2)c.
In the case when the government o¤ers reservation wages and sets a high audit intensity such that in
equilibrium all corruptible tax inspectors behave honestly, the corresponding net revenues are
NRH = n (1  x  c) (11  a)
Since the size of audit intensity that ensures honest equilibrium is now bigger (as compared to without
peer-e¤ects), net revenues in (11  a) are less than without peer-e¤ects in (11).
Consider now the case when audit is at intermediate level, then, from Proposition 6, there are multiple
equilibria. Strategic complementarity implies that there can be two equilibria where either all corruptible
tax inspectors are corrupt or all stay honest. The equilibrium depends on the coordination of corruptible
tax inspectors. They may coordinate on "corrupt" ( = 1) or on "honest" ( = 0) equilibrium. If they
coordinate on honest equilibrium, there will be no matching with corruptible households and they submit
all taxes. When they coordinate on corrupt equilibrium, they conspire with corruptible tax payers and
they do not submit taxes. We suppose that the government assigns an ex-ante probability q 2 (0; 1) that
corruptible tax inspectors will coordinate on honest equilibrium and they will submit all tax receipts.12
11Also note that L can be maximum where probability of being caught is equal to one, p = 1. Thus the optimal L is
between zero and Lmax =
1
d
.
12This probability depicts the relative optimism of the government regarding corruption outcome. More optimist gov-
ernments put higher probability to be in the honest equilibrium. Governments optimism can be driven by the intrinsic
characteristics of the society i.e. their culture and norms. What makes the government more optimistic can be an important
issue to be explored but that is not the focus here.
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Given this, net revenues of the government are
NRI = q(n  w   cn) + (1  q)NRL
By substituting in for p,
NRI = q(n  w   cn) + (1  q)(nd+ nd2 + (1  d)nd2s  w(1  d2)  cn)
The rst order conditions yield
FOC   qcn+ (1  q)(n2d+ nd2s  2nd22s+ wd2   cn ) = 0
The audit intensity that maximizes NRI is
I =
d2(1  q)(1 + s+ x)  c
2(1  q)d22s
Optimal audit intensity decreases with the cost of auditing and is equal to zero when c = (1  q)c0l.
For the analytical tractability of our results, we consider two extreme cases i.e. either q = 0 or
q = 1. Consider rst the case when a probability that corruptible tax inspectors coordinate on honest
equilibrium is zero. This is a "pessimist" scenario in which the government considers that if it announces
intermediate audit intensity, all corruptible tax inspectors will be corrupt. The optimal audit intensity
will be I = L  d
2(1+s+x) c
2s2d2
. From the equilibrium in Proposition 6, for reservation wages with
intermediate audit to be an equilibrium, audit intensity should at least be equal to . The optimal I
decreases with c and is equal to  when c = c
0
. Given this, the government will announce optimal I
for any c  c0 , and  for any c > c0 . The corresponding net revenues are
NRI =
8<: n

d  x+ (d2(1+s+x) c)2
4s2d2

for c  c0
n
 
d  x+ (d2(1 + s+ x)  c)  2d22s for c > c0 (15)
It is important to note that for any cost of audit less than c0, net revenues with intermediate audit
are equal to net revenues with low audit, and for any c > c
0
, reservation wages with low audit always
generates higher revenues than the intermediate audit. Since in equilibrium, all corruptible tax inspectors
are corrupt, reservation wages with low audit fetches same revenues as reservation wages with intermediate
audit but with smaller audit intensity so the costs. Thus, net revenues with low audit will always be
greater than the net revenues with intermediate audit.
Consider now the "optimist" scenario in which if the government announces intermediate audit, all
corruptible tax inspectors will be honest (q = 1). If this is the case, the government will always announce
the lower bound  and the net revenues will be
NRI = n (1  x  c) (16)
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When all tax inspectors coordinate on the honest equilibrium, there exists a threshold cI  2s
2s+x p4sx+x2
such that NRI = NRc and 8c > cI , the capitulation wage regime generates more revenues than the
reservation with intermediate audit.
From equilibrium condition in (7  a), the wage that deters bribery is f(1;)
we =
(1  d)2 ns
d
Since with peer-e¤ects, probability of being caught is smaller, the size of e¢ ciency wage is bigger than
the one without peer-e¤ects. With given e¢ ciency wage, the audit intensity that maximizes NRe is
e =
p
sp
d(sd+c)
. Since e¢ ciency wage is we = maxfw; f(1;)g, for  = , w = f(1;) and for any
 < , f() > w. Given the optimal audit e, we can deduce a precise condition which demarcates w
and f(1;) in terms of magnitude. Since e decreases with c and  does not depend on c, there exists
a c0  (1  2)c such that for c = c0, e =  and for any c greater than c, e <  implying that
f(1;) > w.
Given this, the corresponding net revenues with e¢ ciency wages are
NRe =
8<: n

1 + 2s  2
p
s
p
sd+cp
d

for c  c0
n (1  x  c) for c < c0
(13  a)
Since the size of the e¢ ciency wage is now bigger, net revenues with e¢ ciency wages are lower than
without peer-e¤ects in (13).
The capitulation wage is wc = w1 a (1 a)ns, which is smaller than the one without peer-e¤ects.
The optimal audit intensity that maximizes NRc is c = 1a  
q
x
a c . The optimal audit intensity 
c
decreases with c, and there exists cc0  (1   )cc such that for any cost of audit greater than cc0, it is
optimal not to audit. Given this, the maximum net revenues of the government with capitulation wages
are
NRc =
8<: n(1  x   ca   2
p
x
p
a  c) for c < cc0
n (1  x  ) for c  cc0
(14  a)
Given the net revenues for each wage scheme, we can now compare di¤erent wage schemes for both
pessimist (q = 0) and optimist (q = 1) scenarios. While doing so we maintain our assumption that  > 
and Lemma 1. Consider rst a pessimist scenario where q = 0; our results in Proposition 4 and 5
are reproduced. The only di¤erence is that the sizes of thresholds of c that demarcate di¤erent wage
regimes are now smaller. In Proposition 4 (for 1  x > bx), the region where capitulation wages dominate
other wage regimes will be bigger (i.e. now we have a threshold bc0 = (1   2)bc < bc). The region
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where reservation wages with high audit dominate other wage regimes will be smaller (i.e. now we have
c0 = (1   2)c < c). Whereas, the region where e¢ ciency wages dominate other wage regimes
remains same as in Proposition 4. Similarly in Proposition 5 (for bx  x  0), our results are reproduced
whereas now, we will have c0h = (1   2)ch < ch. The region where capitulation wages dominate other
wage regimes will be larger and the region where reservation wages with high audit dominate other wage
regimes will be smaller.
In an optimist scenario where the probability that all corruptible tax inspectors coordinate on honest
equilibrium is one (q = 1), the reservation wages with intermediate audit always generates higher revenues
than the reservation wages with high audit. Note that net revenues of reservation wages with intermediate
audit in (16) are same as the net revenues with high audit without peer-e¤ects in (11). By comparing
capitulation wage with other wage regimes; it generates higher revenues than the reservation wages with
intermediate audit for any cost of audit greater than ch, and higher than the e¢ ciency wages for any cost
of audit greater than bc0. Whereas, there exists a threshold c such that NRI = NRe, and for any c < c,
NRI > NRe. Furthermore, by comparing bc0 and ch, there exists a threshold x > bx such that for any x
greater than x, bc0 is greater than ch.
As it was the case without peer-e¤ects, there are two scenarios depending on the size of x. When
x is low, the e¢ ciency wage is always dominated by other wage regimes. Since now, the threshold
that demarcates these two situations is x which is greater than the bx; the region where e¢ ciency wage
is always dominated by other wage regimes will now be bigger. This is quite intuitive as peer-e¤ects
undermine the e¢ ciency of the auditing, thus, the magnitude of impact of auditing on e¢ ciency wage
will be smaller and the e¢ ciency wage will be relatively (as compared to no peer-e¤ects) more expensive.
By combining all results in the optimist scenario when x 2 (0; x), reservation wages with intermediate
audit and capitulation wages dominate all other wage regimes. When auditing is less costly (i.e. c < ch),
the government would be better-o¤ o¤ering reservation wages with intermediate audit and when auditing
is costly (i.e. c  ch), the government would give up against corruption and will o¤er capitulation wages.
When 1  x > x, reservation wages with intermediate audit, e¢ ciency wages and capitulation wages
dominate other wage regimes. For any cost of audit less than bc0, the government is better-o¤ eliminating
corruption. When the cost is small i.e. c 2 (0; c), the government is better-o¤ announcing the reservation
wage with intermediate audit. While for the cost c 2 (c;bc0), the wage incentives (e¢ ciency wage) will
be a dominant strategy in terms of revenues generation. As in the case of q = 0, for any cost of audit
greater than the threshold bc0, the government will have higher revenues by giving up against corruption.
Introduction of peer-e¤ects has not only implications for the equilibrium of corruption but it also
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a¤ects the relative performances of the di¤erent wage schemes. First, when tax inspectors are o¤ered
outside option, there can be multiple equilibria when the audit intensity is in intermediate levels. Second,
since peer-e¤ects undermine the e¤ectiveness of auditing, the size of both the audit intensity and the
e¢ ciency wage that ensure honest equilibrium will be bigger, whereas the capitulation wage will be
smaller. Thus, the range of parameters where capitulation wages dominate other wage regimes will be
larger. This holds even when with reservation wages and intermediate audit, corruptible tax inspectors
coordinate on honest equilibrium.
8 Conclusion
We evaluate the common conviction prevailing among many economists that e¢ ciency wage can be used
as an incentive device to eliminate malfeasance in the government and its cost-e¤ectiveness. Our focus
remains on one branch of the government, i.e. tax department, which may comprise corruptible tax
inspectors who cause tax compliance problems. We explore for a budget balancing government that
when it will launch anti-corruption strategy and would it be cost e¤ective to o¤er wage incentives to
combat corruption. Apart from the e¢ ciency wage, we add reservation wage (outside option) and the
capitulation wage (a wage less than outside option) in the basket of wage strategies for the government.
We have an endogenous monitoring technology, which depends on the governments audit intensity and
the number of corrupt tax inspectors. Furthermore, we add the role of rule of law through the cost of
laundering bribe income.
Endogenous monitoring technology implies that the equilibrium level of corruption not only depends
on the public remuneration scheme but also on the level of audit intensity and the number of other corrupt
tax inspectors. For the wage incentives to be a viable anti-corruption strategy, it must be accompanied
by a non-zero audit intensity. When the government o¤ers e¢ ciency wages and capitulation wages, there
is a unique equilibrium where all tax inspectors stay honest and all are corrupt, respectively. For the
reservation wages, the equilibrium depends on the monitoring technology. For a higher audit intensity,
all tax inspectors stay honest, and for a lower audit intensity, all corruptible tax inspectors are corrupt.
For the intermediate levels of audit intensity, there are multiple equilibria. Corruptible tax inspectors
will be corrupt or will stay honest depending on the proportion of corrupt tax inspectors.
Since audit is costly and the e¤ectiveness of monitoring depends on the number of other corrupt
tax inspectors, there are situations where the government is eventually better-o¤ (in terms of revenues)
giving up against corruption. The government prefers capitulation wage over e¢ ciency wage when the
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cost of audit is high, the tax rate is high, the proportion of corruptible agents is high and the outside
option is low. By giving up against corruption, the government saves revenues from two fronts. First, it
o¤ers a wage less than the outside option, which reduces the wage bill. Second, since at this wage, only
corruptible agents join tax o¢ ces, the government has no incentive to audit them; hence it saves its cost
of monitoring.
Capitulation wage regimes depicts the real world phenomenon of those countries that o¤er public
sector wages lower than the private sector but are supplemented by bribery. For example, Gorodnichenko
and Klara (2007) nd evidence that in Ukraine, public sector employees receive 24-32 percent less wages
than their private sector counter parts. Yet, workers in both sectors have essentially identical level of
consumer expenditures and asset holdings.
Another important aspect of our analysis is the choice of anticorruption tool. If it is optimal (in terms
of net revenues) for the government to deter bribery, it can be achieved either through wage incentives
with non-zero audit (carrot-stick mix) or through o¤ering outside option but with tighter monitoring
(sheer stick). The government is better-o¤ adopting incentive based anti-corruption campaign (carrot-
stick mix) when the cost of audit is intermediate, the tax rate is low, the reservation is high and the
proportion of dishonest agents is not so high. In the case, when it is less costly to audit, the tax rate is
intermediate or high, the reservation is low, the government is better-o¤ o¤ering tax inspectors a wage
equal to private sector and launch massive audit.
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